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SHIRE DEVELOPMENT, a Utah
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Appellants,
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FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, a
Nevada limited partnership,
MARK CHILTON, ROGER S.
TROUNDAY, WARD W. CHILTON,
and STEVEN R. TROUNDAY,

Case No. 890376

Respondents.

Appellants Shire Development ("Shire") and Albert
Charboneau ("Charboneau") will respond herein to the arguments
raised by Respondents (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Frontier") in their Brief.

OBJECTIONS TO FRONTIER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

Shire and Charboneau object to the following statements
contained in Frontier's Statement of Facts.

The paragraph

numbers correspond to the paragraph numbers contained in
Frontier's Brief.

3,

Ignoring the substantial evidence to the contrary,

Frontier asserts that it "intended to and has looked solely to
Glezos for performance" under the November 1, 1984 real estate
contract (the "Contract").

To the contrary, the undisputed

evidence shows that $80,725.11 of the payments made to
Frontier on the contract were paid directly to Frontier by
Shire and Charboneau.

Glezos only paid the first $11,000.00.

Frontier actually picked up one payment from Shire at Shire's
offices in Salt Lake City.

Further, Frontier requested that

Shire and Charboneau agree to a proposed settlement of the
federal court action in which Glezos sought recovery of the
amounts paid under the Contract.

It was only after Shire and

Charboneau would not agree to the settlement that Frontier
secretly entered into an agreement to settle Glezos1 claim for
the $11,000.00 he paid on the Contract. [R. 135-137, 145, 152]
6.

Frontier asserts that it "had no knowledge of the

oral agreement entered into between Glezos and Shire and
Charboneau . . .".
regard.

Clearly, there is an issue of fact in this

As previously demonstrated, Frontier accepted

payments directly from Shire and Charboneau on the Contract in
the amount of $80,725.11 and even picked up one of the
payments from Shire at Shire's offices.

From these facts

alone, a jury could certainly conclude that Frontier knew of
the interest of Shire and Charboneau in the Contract.
else would Shire and Charboneau make the payments?

Why

Further,

Frontier demonstrated its knowledge of the interest of Shire
2

and Charboneau in the Contract and to the return of the monies
paid when during the federal court action Frontier asked Shire
and Charboneau to agree to a settlement.
12.

Frontier states that in September 1987, "Frontier

and Glezos settled the dispute that was the basis of the
United States District Court action . . .".

However, that

agreement in fact only settled Glezos1 claim to the $11,000.00
he had paid under the Contract.

Frontier and Glezos

specifically acknowledged they were not settling any claim
that Shire and Charboneau had to the remaining $80,725.11 paid
on the Contract because Shire and Charboneau would not agree
to a settlement. [R. 73, 136-137, 156]

II.
ARGUMENT

1.

The District Court Erred in Ruling That Shire and

Charboneau Had Received No Interest in the Contract.

Frontier erroneously argues that Shire and Charboneau
have no standing to maintain this action because they cannot
point the Court to a document signed by Glezos expressly
stating that he assigned any rights in the Contract to Shire
and Charboneau.

Frontier's contention is simply wrong and

ignores the uncontroverted evidence in this case.

3

Frontier does not dispute that its Contract with Glezos
allowed Glezos to assign rights in the Contract without any
consent from Frontier.

Nor does Frontier dispute that Glezos

actually entered into an oral joint venture agreement with
Shire and Charboneau for the purchase of the property, nor
that Shire and Charboneau paid the vast majority of the
purchase price directly to Frontier.

What Frontier refuses to

face up to is that the legal effect of the joint venture
agreement was to give Shire and Charboneau an interest in the
Contract as demonstrated by the authorities cited in
Appellants' initial Brief. [Pgs. 10-13]
The cases cited by Frontier in support of its standing
argument are not on point.
For example, Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc.
v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977), did not involve an
assignment or a joint venture.

The plaintiff there sought

recovery from the property owner of sums for materials and
services provided to the lessee of the property without the
knowledge or consent of the owner.

The court simply held that

having not pursued its lien rights, the plaintiff could not
recover from the owner.

The case has nothing to do with the

issues involved in the present case.
In Wvatt v. Bowers, 747 P.2d 881 (Nev. 1987), cited by
Frontier, the court only held that an indemnitee lacked
standing to recover against an investor for breach of the
investor's promise to the indemnitor to sign whatever
4

documents were necessary to personally guaranty a
corporation's lease obligation.
Olson v. Iacometti, 533 P.2d 1360 (Nev. 1975), is
similarly not on point.

There, the court simply held that an

agreement between the holder of a note secured by a Deed of
Trust and the holder of a second note and Deed of Trust on the
same property did not entitle the debtor to a discharge of his
liability on the second note.
Finally, in Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102
(Utah Ct.App. 1988), relied upon by Frontier, the plaintiffs
sold property on a Uniform Real Estate Contract to the
original purchaser.

The original purchaser in turn resold the

property on a second Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The

original seller foreclosed and attempted to hold the
subsequent purchasers liable even though they were not parties
to the plaintiffs' sales contract.

The case was not decided

on summary judgment, but only after a trial before the court.
The court concluded based upon the evidence at trial that the
subsequent purchasers had not assumed any liability under the
first contract.

2.

The Joint Venture Agreement is Not Barred by the

Statute of Frauds.

The district court properly rejected Frontier's argument
that the joint venture agreement was required to be in writing
5

in order to transfer any rights in the Contract to Shire and
Charboneau. [R. 16]
Initially, even if the joint venture agreement were
required to be in writing, Frontier could not object because
it was not a party to the joint venture agreement.

For

example, in Family Finance Fund v. Abraham, 657 P.2d 1319
(Utah 1982), the court held that a prospective buyer of real
property could not assert the statute of frauds to prevent the
enforcement of an oral contract between the sellers and
purchasers of the property.

See, also, Harmon v. Tanner Motor

Tours, 377 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1963).
Second, the Contract for the sale of the property
between Glezos and Frontier was in fact in writing as it was
required to be.

Glezos only orally transferred part of his

interest in the Contract to Shire and Charboneau.

Glezos has

never denied that transfer, the undisputed evidence
demonstrates that it was made and the transfer not required to
be in writing.

For example, in Ellingson v. Sloan, 527 P.2d

1100 (Ariz.App. 1975), the court quoted from Eads v. Murphy,
232 P. 877-879 (Ariz. 1925), as follows:
" While there is some conflict of authority,
yet the overwhelming weight is to the effect that
a parol partnership agreement or joint enterprise
entered into by two or more persons, for the
purpose of purchasing and selling real estate or
interests therein for speculation, the profits to
be divided among the parties, is not within the
statute of frauds relating to the sale of lands or
an interest therein, and that such an agreement
may become effectual and suit maintained thereon,
though not in writing." [527 P.2d at 1105]
6

The third reason the statute of frauds does not apply in
this case is that this is not an action to enforce an oral
conveyance of real property.

Rather, it is simply an

equitable action to recover money admittedly paid by Shire and
Charboneau to Frontier for the purchase of property under a
Contract which everybody admits existed.

The statute of

frauds simply does not apply in such a situation.

See, e.g.,

Jensen v. Whitesides, 370 P.2d 765 (Utah 1962); Davis
v.Preston, 102 S.2d 788 (La. 1958); Woodruff v. Camp, 112
S.E.2d 831 (Ga. 1960).

For example, in Woodruff, the court

held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover money paid
under an unenforceable oral argument to purchase land,
observing:
An action for the purpose of recovering money
paid on such an oral executory contract is an
action for money had and received, and is in no
sense an action either to enforce a contract for
the sale of land or for damages for breach of
contract and is not within the statute of frauds.
It is, therefore, immaterial that the contract or
writing sued upon would be legally insufficient to
authorize its enforcement in terms or to authorize
the recovery of damages for its breach. [112
S.E.2d at 832]
Fourth, even if the statute of frauds otherwise applied,
the payments admittedly paid to Frontier by Shire and
Charboneau constitute part performance of the Contract which
would take the case out of the statute of frauds.

See, In re

Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278 (Utah 1954).
Finally, even if the statute of frauds were applicable,
a written agreement does indeed exist acknowledging the joint
7

venture agreement between Glezos, Shire and Charboneau. That
is the agreement dated September 25, 1986 which the joint
venturers entered into at the time the federal action was
pending between Glezos and Frontier.

In that agreement,

Glezos specifically acknowledged that Shire and Charboneau had
contributed money for the purchase of the property, that they
were entitled to share in any judgment or settlement obtained
from Frontier in Glezos1 action to recover all sums paid under
the Contract in the same percentage as their contributions
toward the purchase of the property, and that the case could
not be settled without the consent of a majority of the joint
venturers.
Frontier downplays the significance of this agreement,
arguing that "the Proceeds Sharing Agreement does not purport
to assign Glezos' interest in the property to Shire and
Charboneau." [Frontier Brief, pg. 9]
import of that agreement.

Frontier misses the

Shire and Charboneau do not contend

that that agreement constituted an assignment of Glezos'
interest in the Contract; that had been accomplished years
earlier at the time the property was purchased and the
purchase price paid to Frontier by Shire and Charboneau.
Rather, the agreement constituted a written acknowledgment by
Glezos of the joint venture and the interest of Shire and
Charboneau in the Contract.

The only interest which remained

at the time this agreement was signed in September of 1986 was
the right to recover the purchase price paid for the property
8

on the ground that to allow Frontier to keep the money would
constitute an unenforceable penalty.
Frontier relies upon Goats v. Bayless Markets, Inc., 481
P.2d 536 (Ariz.App. 1971) for its statute of frauds argument.
That case is distinguishable.

The court in Goats observed

that the oral assignment of the lease was not binding upon the
lessor "without its knowledge and consent". [481 P.2d at 540]
Unlike Goatsf this is not an action to enforce a disputed oral
lease, but to recover money admittedly paid by Shire and
Charboneau to Frontier on a Contract everyone agrees
existed.

Further, the Contract between Frontier and Glezos in

the present case allowed Glezos to assign his interest without
the consent of Frontier.

In addition, there is at the least a

genuine issue of fact as to whether Frontier knew about Shire
and Charboneau's interest in the Contract and by accepting
payments consented to that interest.
Frontier purports to distinguish the joint venture cases
cited by Shire and Charboneau on the basis that all those
cases supposedly stand for is the proposition that if all an
agreement does is "merely govern the relationship and
obligations as between the purchasing joint venturers
themselves" and does not "purport to transfer an interest in
real property", that the agreement does not have to be in
writing but that "such agreements do not give a joint venturer
rights against a seller who contracted only with another joint
venturer." [Frontier Brief, pgs. 12-13]
9

Frontier cites no

authorities for this proposition which unduly restricts the
principles set forth in the authorities cited in Appellants1
initial Brief.

Those authorities demonstrate that a joint

venture agreement for the purchase of property is not required
to be in writing and that once Glezos entered into his joint
venture with Shire and Charboneau, his interest in the
Contract was held in trust for his co-venturers regardless of
any express language of assignment.

Glezos was fully entitled

under his contract with Frontier to transfer all of his
interest without any consent from Frontier.

Frontier accepted

most of the payments on the Contract directly from Shire and
Charboneau and well knew they had an interest in the Contract.
Consequently, Frontier can hardly be heard to complain that
Glezos transferred part of his interest to Shire and
Charboneau or that such transfer was not in writing.
Finally, Frontier asserts that Glezos did not intend the
oral joint venture agreement to be an assignment because in
the Release of Claims executed by Glezos in the settlement of
the federal action in 1987, Glezos1 counsel reserved the right
to assign Glezos' rights to Shire and Charboneau.
argument is without merit.

Again, this

There was no evidence in the court

below of exactly what Glezos1 counsel intended by inserting
that reservation into his agreement with Frontier. Glezos1
intent in this regard is a question of fact. More
importantly, if Glezos had already transferred an interest in
the Contract to Shire and Charboneau by entering into the
10

joint venture, nothing which he unilaterally did in a later
agreement with Frontier could affect that transfer.

The

evidence was uncontroverted that Glezos entered into an oral
joint venture agreement with Shire and Charboneau in 1984 for
the purchase of the property from Frontier.

The legal effect

of the joint venture was to give Shire and Charboneau an
interest in the Contract.

CONCLUSION

Frontier is asking this Court in this equitable action
to adopt a hypertechnical view of the law in order to preclude
Shire and Charboneau from recovering the money which they paid
directly to Frontier on the Contract.

Yet Frontier and Glezos

have already acknowledged that any right to recover this money
belongs to Shire and Charboneau.

Hence, if Shire and

Charboneau do not have standing to recover this money, then no
one does.

It would turn logic on its head to rule that

although Shire and Charboneau were joint venturers with Glezos
for purchase of the property and that Glezos has no right to
recover money which he did not pay, nevertheless Shire and
Charboneau have no standing to recover the money which
Frontier knowingly received directly from them.

If in fact

the evidence at trial shows that it would be an unconscionable
penalty to allow Frontier to keep the money, Frontier should
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be required to pay that

money back to those by whom the

was paid.

money
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